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Abstract
In a multi-battle contest, each time a player competes by investing some of her budgets or
resources in a component battle to collect a value if winning the battle. There are multiple
battles to fight, and the budgets get consumed over time. The final winner in the overall contest
is the one who first reaches some amount of total value. Examples include R & D races, sports
competition, elections, and many more. A player needs to make adequate sequential actions
to win the contest against dynamic competition over time from the others. We are interested
in how much budgets the players would need and what actions they should take in order to
perform well.
We model and study such budget-constrained multi-battle contests where each component
battle is a first-price or all-pay auction. We focus on analyzing the 2-player budget ratio that
guarantees a player’s winning (or falling behind in just a bounded amount of collected value)
against the other omnipotent player. In the settings considered, we give efficient dynamic pro-
grams to find the optimal budget ratios and the corresponding bidding strategies. Our definition
of game, budget constraints, and emphasis on budget analyses provide a new perspective and
analysis in the related context.
1 Introduction
The study of competition with multiple battles or stages dates back to 1980’s [4, 5], and continues
to develop towards more recently [7, 8, 9]. In a multi-battle contest, each time a player competes
by investing some of her budget or resource in a component battle to collect a value if winning the
battle. There are multiple battles, commonly modeled as auctions, for the players to fight, and the
budget get consumed over time. The final result of such a contest is determined by the outcomes
of all these multiple battles, not just from a single battle; the final winner in the overall contest
is the one who first reaches some amount of accumulated value. A player needs to make adequate
sequential actions to win the contest against dynamic competition over time from the others.
One early example of multi-battle contests is R & D competition [4, 5] where a race between
two competitors is a competition that awards a prize such as a patent to the final winner who
first achieves a given amount of progress accumulated in a sequence of battles. In each component
battle, the winning is determined as a stochastic function of the competitors’ efforts. Another broad
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category of examples of multi-battle contests is sports competition [11]. In several sports such as
baseball, basketball, or tennis, two teams or players compete in a series of battles or games with
the final winner to be the one who first wins a certain number of games. Multi-battle contests can
be applied to analyze elections [6]. In the US presidential primaries, the candidate who first wins
a majority of the state elections is nominated by the party, and the winner of each state primary
election is determined as a stochastic function of the candidates’ state-wise campaign expenditures.
Almost all the previous work mentioned [4, 5, 9, 8] considers quasi-linear utilities of the players,
where each player’s utility function that she maximizes can be decomposed as the value for her to
win the final victory subtracted by the total consumed budget or resource. The utility function
linearly depends on the budget spent. This model assumes that the value and the budget invested
are “comparable”. However, this may not always be realistic. In cases, the value of the final grand
winning cannot be well measured or compared with the committed efforts, or the value gained once
succeeding could be too tremendous to be related to the investments. It is not hard to see this in R
& D competition, elections, or sports. In this paper, we thus model the value of the overall winning
separated from the budget, and consider a multi-battle contest as a zero-sum game, which no longer
has quasi-linear utilities, with the player collecting the largest amount of accumulated value being
the final winner. Intuitively, we want to capture the final grand victory out of dominating in the
total value collected from multiple battles, and there may exist plenty of ways to beat the others
by smartly using budgets. Furthermore, the budget or resource limitation is explicitly treated as a
constraint that needs to be satisfied, and is not anymore modeled in the utility functions.1 In the
previous work, since the utility that a player maximizes contains a term of budget consumed, the
concept of limited budget is only implicitly treated. Our model in this paper provides an alternative
perspective to study multi-battle contests, with emphasis on budget constraints.
In this paper, we are interested in how much budgets the players would need and what actions
they should take over time to perform well given the previous results of battles. In most of the
previous work, the sequence of actions a player takes over time, i.e., the strategy, is the main concern
since budgets are just treated as in the discussion above. Subgame perfect (mixed) Nash equilibria
are characterized there. In contrast, we analyze the budget needed and actions of a player against
the others in a pure-strategy adversarial fashion. Specifically, given the total number of battles2,
what is a player’s bidding strategy at some sort of equilibrium or assuming the behavior of the
others, where all the total money spent is constrained by her initial budget? Under our model,
this may lead to searching the huge space of a player’s bidding actions. Since each player wants to
have the largest total value collected to win in the end, with proper assumptions we focus on the
optimal budget ratio (defined in Section 2.2) that a player under study needs to have in order to
guarantee such winning.
In particular, we model the value of each battle in two different ways. One way is to model it
as a fixed value [8] such as winning a game always counted as a point or certain fixed points for
a player or team toward the overall grand winning in a series of sports games (Section 4). In this
paper, we also consider an even more challenging setting where the value of each battle is chosen
from a set of possible values, which may include no value (Section 3). The choice of the value from
the value set is assumed to be decided in adversary as well where the possibility of no value thus
1In [9], budget constraints are explicitly considered as well yet the utility of a player is still quasi-linear, in specific,
it is equal to the total value from the battles won subtracted by the budget spent.
2In some models of multi-battle contests, the total number of battles is not known in advance, and battles go on
until some player wins out such as in [4].
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makes a different budget analysis from the fixed value ones. The chosen common value of each
battle is only revealed to all the players in the beginning of such battle for them to decide actions,
i.e., an online setting. A set instead of a fixed value may better suit applications such as campaigns
for elections or R & D competition where each battle is forfeitable or completely in vain, or just
becomes of no value for any other reasons.
In our basic model, each single battle is a standard first-price auction3 where the losers of a
single auction do not lose budgets in this battle. This may not suit some applications. We thus
also consider a modification of using all-pay auctions to better capture situations where the losers’
bids are sunk cost that consumes budget. We focus on the 2-player case, and the game can be
thought as an extensive form zero-sum game. Assuming the worst possible behavior of player P2
with the choice of the values for bidding (see Section 2.2 for specific definitions), we derive the
results regarding player P1’s budget and bidding strategies in terms of the budget ratio, defined as
the ratio between player P1’s budget and player P2’s budget. To our best knowledge, the “budget
ratio analysis” of this style has never been done in the related context.
This paper is organized as follows. The introduction is followed by models, definitions, and some
preliminary result. Then, we present our main results of the budget ratio analysis for standard
first-price and all-pay auctions, and finally conclusions and future work.
Our Results.
First, we prove that player P1 cannot ensure her final winning when the budget ratio is not enough.
Then, we try to find the optimal winning-guarantee budget ratio given T turns of competition in
total. Note that when the maximum value in the value set of each turn is 1, player ensures she can
win the game right after she wins ⌈T/2⌉ turns. Let the countdown value be the distance between
⌈T/2⌉ and the number of turns that a player has won. Define a n× n matrix M where entry mi,j
is the optimal budget ratio when the countdown value of player P1 is i and the countdown value
of player P2 is j. Note that m⌈T/2⌉,⌈T/2⌉ means the optimal winning-guarantee budget ratio for T
turns. We derive O(T 2) dynamic programs for finding the optimal winning-guarantee budget ratio
as well as its corresponding bidding strategies, in both the cases of fixed value 1 and value set {0, 1}
for both first-price and all-pay auction.4
Moreover, we find the closed form of matrix M so that we can obtain any entry on the fly
in O(1) time. According to the closed form, we conclude an interesting corollary. Though the
optimal budget ratio for T turns increases strictly when T gets larger, in particular with set {0, 1}
the optimal winning-guarantee budget ratio approaches 3 while with fixed value 1 the optimal
winning-guarantee budget ratio is constantly 1, no matter how large T is.
In our original model, the one who does not win the turn will not lose her budget. However,
things change when losers in an auction still need to pay. We consider when two players play
all-pay auctions. Specifically, we define an all-pay ratio α, between 0 to 1, to indicate that one
should pay α of her bid when she does not win the turn. We find the optimal winning-guarantee
budget ratio as well as its corresponding bidding strategies with α = 1. In particular with set
{0, 1}, now the optimal winning-guarantee budget ratio approaches 4 while with fixed value 1 the
3Some of our results are based on first-price auctions. One can alternatively consider second-price auctions and
conduct analysis accordingly.
4Both the cases can be generalized to contain multiple values where still the latter one includes value 0 and the
former one does not, and their corresponding solutions of dynamics programs can be derived. We focus on the
discussion of fixed value 1 and set {0, 1} in this paper.
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optimal winning-guarantee budget ratio approaches 2, no matter how large T is.
Given the results summarized above, one may wonder what a player should do when her initial
budget is not high enough. One way to address this is to ask for the optimal budget ratio when
allowing player P1 to fall behind in at most a bounded amount of value. The result provides another
perspective by using matrix M . Of course, this is not the only way to investigate the case when a
player does not have a high budget. We will propose to investigate the case of “moderate” budgets
in other ways in the future work.
Related Work.
It is the different emphases in this paper such as the definition of budget constraints, players’
objectives (utilities), the questions asked as well as the analyses that set our work apart from the
previous work on multi-battle contests [8, 9, 4, 5]. Quasi-linear utilities that players try to maximize
in the previous work allow the final losers to also have chances to keep positive utilities in the end.
Note that the value gained from each winning of a battle is reflected in players’ utilities while in
our zero-sum game the accumulated value is only translated for determining if a player is a winner
or not. As for analysis, the characterization of perfect mixed Nash equilibria in the previous work
is very different from the worst-case analysis on the budgets in this paper.
Due to the budget constraints, our work here is also related to sequential auctions for multiple
objects with budget-constrained bidders where each bidder could only buy at most one object. In
our multi-battle contest, we want each player’s budget high enough to pay for multiple objects yet,
at the same time, budget constraints enforce that players cannot have luxury just to bid high to
win values without worrying about running out of budget too soon. Some earlier work studied
sequential auctions for heterogeneous objects of private value [10, 2] and of common value [1] with
complete information about budget constraints. Our budget constraints in this paper are also
known to each player. The more recent work [3] of Fatima et al. is different from the previous work
by combining common-values and budget-constraints under incomplete information about budget
constraints.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The Game Model
We first describe the general game setting, and the specific variant that we are studying in this
paper:
The general game setting: There are two players P1 and P2, each with initial budget b1 and
b2, respectively. The game consists of T turns, where in turn j, an object with a value πj chosen
from a set is open for bidding, and players are free to use any portion of their remaining budgets to
enter the bidding. Let Πi and Bi be, respectively, the total value obtained by Pi and the remaining
budget of Pi after T turns. The score of Pi is Si = Πi + c×Bi for some predefined constant c.
Our game: We consider two cases for the value of each turn: a fixed value and a value chosen
from a set. In the former case, a player winning a turn always earns value 1. In the latter case,
we assume that the value for each turn corresponds to a value chosen from set {0, 1}. The bidding
follows the first-price sealed-bid auction, where we assume that P1 is the dealer, so that if there is
a tie in the bids, P1 takes the object. After T turns, whoever with the higher score Si wins the
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game; in case the scores tie, P1 wins. Finally, we assume that c is 0 or very close to 0, so that
Si ≈ Πi, and the effect of remaining budget is negligible.
2.2 Problem Definition
Given the budget b2 of player P2, our target is to determine what is the minimum value of budget
b1, so that in the worst case player P1 can always be guaranteed to win the game. We call this the
optimal budget problem. Observe that for this problem in the case of value set {0, 1}, it is equivalent
to assume P2, at each turn, to have the omnipotent power of controlling the choice of the value
from {0, 1}, and learning P1’s bid before making her own bid.
Exponential-time solution for integer bids: For given budgets b1 and b2, if the number
of choices for each player at each turn is finite (say, a bid must be of whole dollar), then we
can determine if b1 is sufficient to guarantee a win for P1, via the min-max game tree which is a
standard tool for analysing two-player games. Here, a minor adaptation is made to cater for P2’s
omnipotent power. Firstly, each turn starts with P2’s choice of the value from set {0, 1}, followed
by P1’s bidding choice, and then followed by P2’s bidding choice; the sequence of these choices is
captured by a tree. Next, at each point where a player makes a choice, there is an associated node
corresponding to that player, with each choice represented by a branch to a distinct child node.
Then, each leaf of the tree corresponds to a explicit situation where a game may end; for our case,
either P1 wins (W ) or loses (L), so that a leaf is marked with the corresponding label. Each node
for a player Pi chooses from the labels of its children that favours Pi most. That is, P1’s node will
choose W if at least one of its children is labeled with W , and choose L otherwise. Similarly, P2’s
node will choose L if at least one of its children is labeled with L, and choose W otherwise. The
label of the root then determines if P1 is winning or not.
Based on the min-max tree, we have the following claim.
Claim 1. Suppose that each bid is of whole dollar. Then, the optimal budget problem can be solved
in O(b∗× (2 (b∗ +1) (b2 +1))
T ) time, where b∗ denotes the minimum budget that P1 needs when P2
has initial budget b2.
Proof. The size of the min-max tree for a particular initial budget b1 of P1 is O((2 (b1+1)(b2+1))
T )).
By a linear search for the minimum b1 (starting from 1) such that P1 can guarantee to win the
game, the total time is bounded by O(b∗ × (2 (b∗ + 1)(b2 + 1))
T ). The claim follows.
Optimal budget ratio for fractional bids: It is easy to extend the min-max tree approach
to analyse a game in the general setting. Yet, it suffers from two drawbacks: (i) the running
time depends on the number of choices for each turn, which is not suitable for large b2, and
(ii) the running time is exponential in the number of turns, T . In the remaining of this paper, we
consider the problem when each bid can be any arbitrary non-negative real number. This seemingly
increases the number of choices to infinite, but on the other hand enriches the problem with better
mathematical properties, thus allowing us to find the minimum budget b∗ for b1 more efficiently.
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Moreover, for a T -turn game, if b∗ is an optimal budget that corresponds to b2, then K × b
∗/b2
must be an optimal budget when P2 starts with budget K for any positive real K. Without loss of
generality, we will focus on finding the optimal budget ratio (OBR) b∗/b2
5Intuitively, this has similar flavour between an integer programming and its linear-programming relaxation.
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For ease of discussion, we assume that b2 is 1, so that the minimum budget b1 for P1 to guarantee
a win is exactly the OBR. Furthermore, at any time of the game, we refer to the total value that
a player has acquired as her partial score at that time.
3 Finding the Optimal Budget Ratio: Value Set
We first show two simple relationships between the partial score and the winner of the game.
Lemma 1. For P1 to win the game, the partial score of P1 must be greater than, or equal to, that
of P2 at any time.
Proof. Assume, on the contrary, that P1 wins the game and at some time P2 has greater partial
score than P1. Then, by P2’s omnipotent power, P2 can set all the remaining outcomes 0 to make
herself the winner. A contradiction occurs, and the observation thus follows.
Lemma 2. If at some time, the partial score of a player Pi becomes ⌈T/2⌉, then Pi wins the game.
Proof. Firstly, we observe that the total score of two players after T turns is at most T . Thus,
if P1 first obtains a partial score of ⌈T/2⌉, P1 wins the game as she is the dealer. On the other
hand, if P2 first obtains a partial score of ⌈T/2⌉, P2 can use her omnipotent power to make all the
subsequent outcomes 0, thus allowing herself to win the game.
3.1 Analysis for First-Price Auctions
As a warm-up to the discussion, we shall show that when T ≥ 3, OBR is at least 3/2. To see this,
suppose on the contrary that b1 < 3/2. Then, P2 sets the first outcome to be 1, and bids all her
$1 budget on that. For P1 to win, by Lemma 1, P1 has to bid at least $1 at this turn, taking the
value of the outcome. But then, the budget of P1 becomes smaller than $1/2, so that in the next
two turns, P2 will set both outcomes to be 1, bid $1/2 at both turns, thus taking the values of
both outcomes. So after 3 turns, P2 has greater partial score than P1, so that P1 loses the game.
A contradiction occurs, so that the lower bound of 3/2 for OBR, when T ≥ 3, follows.
In the following, we define a concept called OBR countdown matrix based on Lemma 2, and show
how to use it to find the OBR for a T -turn game efficiently.
OBR Countdown Matrix.
Suppose that at some time, the partial score of P1 is x, and the partial score of P2 is y. Then, either
(i) a winner is determined when x or y is greater than ⌈T ′/2⌉, where T ′ denotes the maximum
combined score that can be achieved in this game, or else (ii) if P1 gets additional values of
i = ⌈T ′/2⌉ − x before P2 gets additional values of j = ⌈T
′/2⌉ − y, then P1 wins the game by
Lemma 2, or else (iii) if P2 gets additional values of j before P1 gets additional values of i, then
P2 wins the game. The values i and j are, respectively, referred to as the countdown values of P1
and P2 at that time. This motivates us to define a ⌈T/2⌉ × ⌈T/2⌉ matrix M = [mi,j ], called OBR
countdown matrix, such that mi,j denotes the optimal budget ratio when countdown value of P1
is i and countdown value of P2 is j. Then, the value m⌈T/2⌉,⌈T/2⌉ is the desired OBR for a T -turn
game.
Next, we describe five lemmas concerning the values of mi,j in different scenarios.
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Lemma 3. When i > j, mi,j is +∞ (i.e., the value is undefined).
Proof. When i > j, the countdown value of P2 is smaller than that of P1, which implies that P2
has a greater partial score than P1. In such a case, by Lemma 2, P1 cannot win no matter how
much budget she has. Thus, the value mi,j in this case is +∞.
Lemma 4. For any i and j with 1 ≤ i ≤ j, we have mi,j ≤ mi+1,j+1.
Proof. Consider the time when the countdown values of P1 and P2 are i+1 and j+1, respectively.
Then, P2 has an option to use her omnipotent power to make the outcomes of the next turn, or next
two turns, be 0. This effectively decreases the maximum combined score T ′ that can be achieved in
this game, so that the countdown values of P1 and P2 will be updated to i and j. Thus, the OBR
in the former case (with countdown values i+1, j +1) must be at least the OBR in the latter case
(with countdown values i, j); in other words, mi,j ≤ mi+1,j+1.
Lemma 5. For all j, m1,j = 1/j.
Proof. Consider the time when the countdown values of P1 and P2 are 1 and j, respectively. Then,
we have the following observations.
• First, suppose that P1 has $1/j. Then, P1 can ensure the winning by bidding all her budget
at each subsequent turn that has outcome 1, until she wins the value. Either P1 will acquire
the extra value of 1 in the process, or P2 gets at most a total of j − 1 extra values, which is
not enough to exceed the score of P1. Thus, P1 wins in either case, which implies m1,j ≤ 1/j.
• Conversely, suppose that P1 has less than $1/j. Then, P2 may use her omnipotent power to
make all outcomes of the next j turns be 1, where she bids $1/j for each turn. Thus, P2 will
get j extra values before P1 gets 1. By Lemma 2, P2 wins the game. This implies m1,j ≥ 1/j.
Combining the above bounds on m1,j gives the desired bound m1,j = 1/j. The lemma follows.
Lemma 6. For all i ≥ 2, mi,i = 1 +mi−1,i.
Proof. When i = j, both players have the same countdown value. By Lemma 1, P1 has to win the
next bid whose outcome is 1, where she can do so only by bidding with the same budget as P2 (i.e.,
bidding $1). The remaining budget of P1 must be enough for her to win at the case where P1 has
countdown value i− 1 and P2 has countdown value i. Thus,
mi,i = 1 + max
2≤k≤i
{mk−1,k } = 1 +mi−1,i,
where the first equality comes from the fact that after P1 wins the next bid, the countdown values
of P1 and P2, respectively, will be k− 1 and k for some k ∈ [2, i], while the second equality follows
from Lemma 4. This completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 7. When 2 ≤ i < j, the following recurrence holds:
mi,j =
mi,j−1 (1 +mi−1,j)
1 +mi,j−1
.
7
Proof. Consider the time when the countdown values of P1 and P2 are i and j, respectively. For
P1 to guarantee a win at this time, her minimum budget will be mi,j, and such a budget should
allow her to post some optimal bid r∗ at this turn to her favour. Precisely, we must have
r∗ = argmin
r
max { r +mi−1,j, (1 − r)mi,j−1 },
where the first term is the minimum budget that P1 needs when P1 gets the next value, the second
term is the minimum budget that P1 needs when P2 gets the next value, and the max operator
corresponds to P2’s choice to maximize P1’s minimum budget. Then, from P1’s point of view, the
best r must come from the case when the two terms are equal, so that
r∗ =
mi,j−1 −mi−1,j
1 +mi,j−1
.
Consequently, we have
mi,j = r
∗ +mi−1,j = (1− r
∗)mi,j−1
=
mi,j−1 (1 +mi−1,j)
1 +mi,j−1
.
Getting OBR from the Matrix.
The lemmas above allow us to fill in the matrix M , using O(1) time per entry, as follows:
1. Fill in the first row of M by Lemma 5.
2. For i = 2 to ⌈T/2⌉
(a) Fill in mi,i by Lemma 6, based on mi−1,i that has been computed.
(b) For j = i + 1 to ⌈T/2⌉, fill in mi,j by Lemma 7, based on mi−1,j and mi,j−1 that have
been computed.
Immediately, we have that for a T -turn game, the OBR countdown matrix M can be obtained in
O(T 2) time. Indeed, the following theorem gives a closed-form for each entry of M , so that we can
obtain any entry on the fly in O(1) time.
Theorem 8. For any i ≤ j, the closed form of mi,j in the OBR countdown matrix M is:
mi,j =
i (j − i+ 3)
(j − i+ 1)(j + 2)
.
Proof. Let F (i, j) denote the above closed form. We show that mi,j = F (i, j) by induction on the
row number i (and with increasing order in the column number j). First, the basis case is true,
since F (1, j) = (1 × (j + 2))/(j × (j + 2)) = 1/j = m1,j. Next, assume inductively that all entries
in the kth row satisfy the closed form. Then, when i = k + 1 and j = i = k + 1, we have:
mk+1,k+1 = 1 +mk,k+1 = 1 + F (k, k + 1)
= 1 +
2k
k + 3
=
3k + 3
k + 3
= F (k + 1, k + 1).
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As for i = k + 1 and j > i, we have:
mk+1,j
=
mk+1,j−1 (1 +mk,j)
1 +mk+1,j−1
=
F (k + 1, j − 1) (1 + F (k, j))
1 + F (k + 1, j − 1)
=
(k + 1)(j − k + 1)
(j − k − 1)(j + 1)
×
(
1 +
k (j − k + 3)
(j − k + 1)(j + 2)
)
÷
(
1 +
(k + 1)(j − k + 1)
(j − k − 1)(j + 1)
)
=
(k + 1)[(j − k + 1)(j + 2) + k (j − k + 3)]
(j + 2)[(j − k − 1)(j + 1) + (k + 1)(j − k + 1)]
=
(k + 1)[(j − k + 2)(j + 2)− (j − 2) + k (j − k + 2) + k]
(j + 2)[(j − k)(j + 1)− (j + 1) + (k + 1)(j − k) + (k + 1)]
=
(k + 1)(j − k + 2)[(j + 2) + k − 1]
(j + 2)(j − k)[(j + 1) + (k + 1)− 1]
=
(k + 1)(j − k + 2)
(j + 2)(j − k)
= F (k + 1, j).
Thus, all entries in the (k+1)th row satisfy the closed form, so that the inductive case is true. The
theorem thus follows.
This gives the following corollary.
Corollary 9. Let obr (T ) denote the optimal budget ratio for a T -turn game with set {0, 1}. Then,
we have:
1. obr (T ) = m⌈T/2⌉,⌈T/2⌉ = (3 ⌈T/2⌉)/(⌈T/2⌉ + 2).
2. obr (T ) is increasing.
3. limT→∞ obr(T ) = 3.
3.2 Analysis for All-Pay Auctions
In the discussion so far, we have implicitly assumed that the loser of a bid does not need to pay.
However, in practical settings such as our presidential election example, if a player bids for r units
at some turn but loses the bid, it is often that some fraction α ∈ [0, 1], called all-pay ratio, of the
bid (i.e., α r units) has to be deducted from the budget for some overhead cost.
To compute the optimal budget ratio in this case, we can apply a similar analysis as before, where we
define an OBR countdown matrix N = [ni,j], such that ni,j denotes the OBR when the countdown
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values of P1 and P2 are i and j, respectively. Note that with such a charging scheme, P2 may use
her omnipotent power to learn P1’s bid r beforehand, so that P2 either pays 0 when she does not
want to win the bid, or pays r + ǫ for an arbitrary small ǫ > 0 when she wants to win the bid.
Then, it is easy to argue that (i) ni,j = +∞ for i > j, and (ii) the following recurrences hold:
1. n0,j = 0 for all j ≥ 1.
2. ni,i = 1 + ni−1,i for i ≥ 1.
3. ni,j = ni−1,j+r
∗ = ni,j−1 (1−r
∗)+α r∗ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ j, where r∗ denotes the optimal bid P1
should set at a turn when the countdown values of P1 and P2 are i and j, respectively. The
middle term corresponds to the case where P1 wins the bid, so that P1 still needs a budget of
ni−1,j to win. The last term corresponds to the case where P2 wins the bid, so that P1 first
needs to pay α r∗ for the overhead cost, and needs a budget of ni,j−1 (1− r
∗) to win.
Evaluating the third recurrence in the above, we get:
ni,j =
ni,j−1ni−1,j + ni,j−1 − αni−1,j
ni,j−1 + (1− α)
.
Based on the above recurrences, all entries ni,j with i ≤ j can be filled in a total of O(T
2) time;
after that, we can obtain the desired OBR as n⌈T/2⌉,⌈T/2⌉. Moreover, we may derive closed form as
before.
Theorem 10. For the standard all-pay auction, we have α = 1, and the corresponding closed form,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ j, is:
ni,j = 1 +
(i− 1)(j − i+ 3)
(j − i+ 1)(j + 1)
,
indicating that the OBR in this case is increasing and has a limit of 4.
Proof. We show that when α = 1, the entry ni,j in the OBR countdown matrix in all-pay auction,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ j, is equal to:
G(i, j) = 1 +
(i− 1)(j − i+ 3)
(j − i+ 1)(j + 1)
,
where ni,j satisfies the following recurrences:
1. n0,j = 0 for all j ≥ 1, and ni,j = +∞ when i > j.
2. ni,i = 1 + ni−1,i for i ≥ 1.
3. ni,j = 1 + (ni−1,j (ni,j−1 − 1)/ni,j−1) for all 1 ≤ i < j,
To simplify the proof, we first observe the interesting fact that
1. G(i, j) = 1 for 1 = i ≤ j.
2. G(i, j) = 1 +mi−1,j−1 for 2 ≤ i ≤ j, where mi,j is the entry in the OBR countdown matrix
M for first-price auction.
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Furthermore, if we assume that m0,j = 0, the recurrence about mi,i in Lemma 6 is generalized for
i ≥ 1, and the recurrence about mi,j in Lemma 7 is generalized for 1 ≤ i < j, then, the above two
facts can be unified as:
G(i, j) = 1 +mi−1,j−1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ j.
Thus, to show the correctness of the closed form, it is equivalent to proving that ni,j = 1+mi−1,j−1
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ j.
Our proof goes by induction on the row number i (and with increasing order in the column number
j). First, the basis case corresponds to i = 1, in which we obtain n1,1 = 1 and n1,j = 1 + 0 = 1, so
that n1,j = 1+m0,j−1 for all j ≥ i. Next, assume inductively that all entries in the kth row satisfy
the closed form.
Then, when i = k + 1 and j = i = k + 1, we have:
nk+1,k+1 = 1 + nk,k+1 = 1 + 1 +mk−1,k
= 1 +mk,k,
where the last equality follows from (the generalised) Lemma 6.
As for i = k + 1 and j > i, we have:
nk+1,j = 1 +
nk,j (nk+1,j−1 − 1)
nk+1,j−1
= 1 +
(1 +mk−1,j−1)mk,j−2
1 +mk,j−2
= 1 +mk,j−1,
where the last equality follows from (the generalised) Lemma 7.
Thus, all entries in the (k + 1)th row satisfy the closed form, so that the inductive case is true.
This completes the proof of the induction, and consequently the closed form is correct.
3.3 Further Discussion
Suppose that the initial budget ratio b1/b2 is at least the OBR. Then, P1 can guarantee to win the
game by bidding with the following strategy:
Initially, P1 keeps track of P2’s current budget B as b2, and sets the countdown values i
and j of both players to be ⌈T/2⌉. At each turn, if the outcome is 1, P1 uses countdown
values i and j (of P1 and P2, respectively) to compute r
∗ = mi,j−mi−1,j, and bids with
r∗×B, and aslo updates i, j, and B depending who wins the bid;6 else, if the outcome
is 0, P1 updates i and j if needed.
The above strategy has the advantages that (i) the optimal bid for each turn can be decided in
O(1) time, and (ii) the updates for each turn take O(1) time. Morevoer, if P2 does not have
6In case P2 wins the bid, but her bidding price is not disclosed, then P1 simply assumes pessimistically that P2
wins the bid with r∗ + ǫ, and updates B as B − r∗.
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omnipotent power, then P1 may win the game with less budget, since P2 may be overbidding (as
she does not know P1’s bid), or cannot force a worst-case scenario (as she does not control the
outcome).
Bounded Falling Behind.
In most real-life scenarios, the initial budget ratio would be less than the OBR, so that there is
no guaranteed winning. However, P1 may still want some guarantee of her performance, say,
the difference S2 − S1 between the score of P2 and the score of P1 is at most k. In such a
handicapped game, the OBR for a T -turn game becomes m⌈(T−k)/2⌉,⌈(T+k)/2⌉, since if P1 gets a
score of ⌈(T − k)/2⌉ beforehand, the score difference S2−S1 is at most k, while on the other hand,
if P2 gets a score of ⌈(T + k)/2⌉ beforehand, P2 can then use her omnipotent power to make the
remaining outcomes all 0, so that S2 − S1 is at least k + 1.
4 Finding the Optimal Budget Ratio: Fixed Value
In some contests such as sports, the winner of each component battle accumulates her partial score
by a fixed value. We model this scenario by fixing the value of each battle to 1. Player P2 becomes
less powerful, as she can no longer control the common value for bidding of each turn. In this
section, we study the OBR for player P1 under this model.
4.1 Analysis for First-Price Auctions
As before, we define an OBR countdown matrix L = [ℓi,j], such that ℓi,j denotes the optimal budget
ratio where countdown value of P1 and P2 are i and j, respectively. The following are some lemmas
concerning the values of ℓi,j in different scenarios.
Lemma 11. For all j, ℓ1,j = 1/j.
Proof. Consider the time when the countdown values of P1 and P2 are 1 and j, respectively. Then,
we have the following observations.
• First, suppose that P1 has a budget b1 = $1/j and P2 has a budget b2 = $1 . Since the
countdown value of P1 is 1, the game ends as soon as P1 wins a turn. Now, P1 bids all
her budget at each subsequent turn (which has outcome 1). To avoid P1 from winning
immediately, P2 has to use her budget to win each turn, thus paying at least 1/j for each
turn; yet, P2 can win at most j − 1 turns, after which her budget drops below 1/j, and P1
would win the next turn. Thus, P1 prevails, which implies ℓ1,j ≤ 1/j.
• Conversely, suppose that P1 has a budget less than $1/j. Then, P2 may use her omnipotent
power to make all outcomes of the next j turns be 1, where she bids $1/j for each turn. Thus,
P2 will get j extra values before P1 gets 1. By Lemma 2, P2 wins the game. This implies
ℓ1,j ≥ 1/j.
Combining the above bounds on ℓ1,j gives the desired bound ℓ1,j = 1/j. The lemma follows.
Lemma 12. For all i, ℓi,1 = i.
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Proof. Since P2 only needs to win one turn to win the whole game, to avoid this from happening,
P1 must bid the same amount as P2’s budget in each subsequent turn, for i turns, until she wins.
This implies that ℓi,1 = i.
Lemma 13. When 2 ≤ i, j, the following recurrence holds:
ℓi,j =
ℓi,j−1 (1 + ℓi−1,j)
1 + ℓi,j−1
.
Proof. The lemma follows from an analogous proof as that of Lemma 7.
Getting OBR from the Matrix.
The lemmas from the previous subsection allow us to fill in the matrix L, using O(1) time per
entry, as follows:
1. Fill in the first row of L by Lemma 11.
2. Fill in the first column of L by Lemma 12.
3. For i = 2 to ⌈T/2⌉
(a) For j = 2 to ⌈T/2⌉, fill in ℓi,j by Lemma 13, based on ℓi−1,j and ℓi,j−1 that have been
computed.
Immediately, we have that for a T -turn game, the OBR countdown matrix L can be obtained in
O(T 2) time. Indeed, the following theorem gives a closed-form for each entry of L, so that we can
obtain any entry on the fly in O(1) time.
Theorem 14. For any i, j, the closed form of ℓi,j in the OBR countdown matrix L is:
ℓi,j = i/j,
indicating that the OBR in this case is constantly 1.
Proof. Let H(i, j) denote the above closed form. We show that ℓi,j = H(i, j) by induction on the
row number i (and with increasing order in the column number j). First, the basis case of first
row is true, since H(1, j) = 1/j = ℓ1,j. Also, the basis case of first column is also true, since
H(i, 1) = i/1 = i = ℓi,1. Next, assume inductively that entries ℓi−1,j and ℓi,j−1 satisfy the closed
form. Then, considering entry li,j, we have:
ℓi,j =
i/(j − 1) · (1 + (i− 1)/j)
1 + i/(j − 1)
=
i · (i+ j − 1)/j
i+ j − 1
= i/j = H(i, j).
Thus, all entries satisfy the closed form, so that the inductive case is true. The theorem thus
follows.
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4.2 Analysis for All-Pay Auctions
The analysis for the case with all-pay auction, with α = 1, is similar. We define an OBR countdown
matrix Q = [qi,j], such that qi,j denotes the optimal budget ratio where countdown value of P1 and
P2 are i and j in this scenario, respectively. We have the following three lemmas.
Lemma 15. For all j, q1,j = 1.
Proof. Consider the time when the countdown values of P1 and P2 are 1 and j, respectively. Then,
we have the following observations.
• First, suppose that P1 has the same budget as P2. Then, P1 can ensure the winning by
bidding all her budget at the first turn which implies q1,j ≤ 1.
• Conversely, suppose that P1’s budget is less than P2’s. Then, each time P1 bids r, P2 can
bid r + ǫ, for an arbitrarily small ǫ > 0, to win the turn. In this way, P2 will win all the
subsequent turns, thus getting j extra values before P1 gets 1. By Lemma 2, P2 wins the
game. This implies q1,j ≥ 1.
Combining the above bounds on q1,j gives the desired bound q1,j = 1. The lemma follows.
Lemma 16. For all i, qi,1 = i.
Proof. Since P2 only needs one more turn to win the game, to avoid this from happening, P1 must
bid the same amount as P2’s budget in each subsequent turn, for i turns, to win the game. This
implies that qi,1 = i.
Lemma 17. When 2 ≤ i, j, the following recurrence holds:
qi,j = 1 −
qi−1,j
qi,j−1
+ qi−1,j.
Proof. Consider the time when the countdown values of P1 and P2 are i and j, respectively. For
P1 to guarantee a winning, her minimum budget will be qi,j, and such a budget should allow her
to post some optimal bid r∗ at this turn to her favour. Precisely, we must have
r∗ = argmin
r
max { r + qi−1,j, r + (1− r) qi,j−1 },
where the first term is the minimum budget that P1 needs when P1 gets the next value, the
second term is the minimum budget that P1 needs when P2 gets the next value; the max operator
corresponds to P2’s choice to maximize P1’s minimum budget. Then, from P1’s point of view, the
best r must come from the case when the two terms are equal, so that
r∗ = 1−
qi−1,j
qi,j−1
.
Consequently, we have
qi,j = r
∗ + qi−1,j = 1 −
qi−1,j
qi,j−1
+ qi−1,j.
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The above lemmas allow us to fill in the matrix Q in the same way as we fill in L as follows:
1. Fill in the first row of Q by Lemma 15.
2. Fill in the first column of Q by Lemma 16.
3. For i = 2 to ⌈T/2⌉
(a) For j = 2 to ⌈T/2⌉, fill in qi,j by Lemma 17, based on qi−1,j and qi,j−1 that have been
computed.
Immediately, we have that for a T -turn game, the OBR countdown matrix Q can be obtained in
O(T 2) time. Indeed, the following theorem gives a closed-form for each entry of Q, so that we can
obtain any entry on the fly in O(1) time.
Theorem 18. For any i, j, the closed form of qi,j in the OBR countdown matrix Q is:
qi,j =
i+ j − 1
j
,
indicating that the OBR in this case is increasing and has a limit of 2.
Proof. Let J(i, j) denote the above closed form. We show that qi,j = J(i, j) by induction. First,
the basis case of first row is true, since J(1, j) = (1 + j − 1)/j = 1 = q1,j. Also, the basis case of
first column is also true, since J(i, 1) = (i + 1 − 1)/1 = i = qi,1. Next, assume inductively that
entries qi−1,j and qi,j−1 satisfy the closed form. Then, considering entry qi,j, we have:
qi,j = 1 −
(
i+ j − 2
j
)
÷
(
i+ j − 2
j − 1
)
+
(
i+ j − 2
j
)
= 1 −
j − 1
j
+
i+ j − 2
j
=
i+ j − 1
j
= J(i, j).
Thus, all entries satisfy the closed form, so that the inductive case is true. The theorem follows.
Remark 1. A discussion similar to Section 3.3 for the corresponding bidding strategies and bounded
falling behind in the case of a fixed value can be analogously conducted here.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
We model and study budget-constrained multi-battle contests as extensive form zero-sum games.
When each turn is a first-price or all-pay auction with fixed value 1 or value set {0, 1}, we focus
on analyzing the 2-player optimal budget ratio that guarantees player P1’s winning (or losing a
bounded number of valued turns) against an omnipotent player P2. We give efficient dynamic
programs to find the optimal budget ratio and the corresponding series of bidding strategies.
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In our current results, we mainly ensure player P1’s winning when her budget is not less than the
optimal budget ratio; when allowing player P1 to lose at most a bounded number of valued battles,
we in some sense relax her budget requirement to be less since the optimal ratio is smaller now. Yet,
this is not the only way to look at cases when the budget ratio is less than the optimal one. Another
direction is to ask about bidding strategies that lead to more situations (i.e., a series of values
chosen from the value set) ending up in winning since now a player with a moderate budget may
not always win. Inspired by the budget ratio analysis here, there might exist a dynamic program
to find such bidding strategies that maximize the winning situations over all possible situations.
Other immediate things to consider include lessening player P2’s power by making the number of
valued turns known to player P1. Generally, considering multiple players in budget-constrained
multi-battle contests is challenging, and may take other approaches to analyze.
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